Whatever the current burning issue is - trade with Iran, war with Iraq, support for Israel, building a missile defense system, accepting the International Criminal Court - Americans and West Europeans often find themselves on opposite sides of the argument.
Americans tend to dismiss the Europeans as soft-minded appeasers lacking moral fiber or strategic vision. In turn, Europeans depict Americans as cowboys under the sway of a "culture of death."
These current attitudes tend to be seen as immutable facts of life, arising out of the respective national characters. But these differences are hardly permanent. Two centuries ago, when Americans acted cautiously around the tough-guy Europeans, the roles were roughly reversed.
Today's attitudes, Robert Kagan writes in a brilliant analysis in the Hoover Institution's "Policy Review," follow logically from deeper realities. In particular, they result from two post-1945 developments so momentous they tend to go unnoted:
* Europe is weak: For 500 years before 1945, Europe dominated the world. Tiny Portugal and Holland took turns ruling the seas. Mid-sized Britain and France built empires that spanned the globe. But that was then.
Today, the European Union spends far more on social problems than on arms. Despite a population and an economy roughly similar to America's, it is a "military pygmy" that lacks the ability to project force or even handle a minor problem in its own neighborhood (as the Balkan fiascos revealed).
In contrast, Americans have continued massively investing in defense, creating a true superpower no other state can challenge. "In military terms there is only one player on the field that counts," observes Yale historian Paul Kennedy. Looking at the contrast between the United States and the rest of the world, Kennedy finds that "Nothing has ever existed like this disparity of power; nothing."
This huge gap in capabilities causes Europeans and Americans to approach problems very differently. In their strength, Americans predictably see it as normal and legitimate to use force against enemy states such as Iraq. In their weakness, Europeans no less predictably find this approach worrisome and even immoral.
* Europe is post-modern: For the 80 years before 1945, the demon of German aggression haunted Europe, causing two world wars. Then, through a lengthy process of negotiation, multilateralism, building commercial ties and applying international law, the Europeans engineered what Kagan calls "perhaps the greatest feat of international politics ever achieved" by integrating Germany into a totally peaceable Western European state system.
As the German lion lay down with the French lamb, Europeans widely congratulated themselves on a world-historical breakthrough and concluded that their future global mission is to develop a "postmodern system" that resolves problems without even the hint of force. (Along the way, they conveniently forgot that this transformation was only made possible because U.S. forces defeated Germany.) They aspire, Kagan argues, to replicate their success on a global scale, by taming a North Korea or an Iraq as they did Germany.
From this vantage point, American use of force challenges the universal validity of Europe's soft approach. Worse: if the European methods of cajoling and paying off adversaries do not always work - as they clearly do not - this suggests that Europe's own hope for perpetual peace among states may be illusory. The European Union's highly emotional reaction to American use of force derives in large part, then, from its horror at facing war again in Europe.
The differences, in brief, are stark: Americans are from Mars; Europeans, from Venus. Europeans spend their money on social services, Americans continue to devote large sums to the military. Europeans draw lessons from their successful pacifying of post-1945 Germany; Americans draw lessons from their defeat of Nazi Germany and of the Soviet bloc. Kagan's insights have important implications:
* U.S.-European differences are not transitory, but long-term.
* They are likely to grow with time.
* Europe is highly unlikely to develop a military power to rival America's.
* As Europe settles into strategic irrelevance, Americans need pay it less and less attention.
* Contrarily, because Washington so predominates, it should make gestures to win European goodwill.
* NATO is little more than a shell.
* Americans should look increasingly to countries outside Europe - Turkey, Israel and India come first to mind - for meaningful military alliances.
fails to take into account that America's super-power is fueled by a super-economy, which, in the coming decades, my catastrohpically fail in a manner similar to the fall of the USSR.
Dekka00 said this in post #3 : America's super-power is fueled by a super-economy, which, in the coming decades, my catastrohpically fail in a manner similar to the fall of the USSR.
America's achievement is based largely on human beings. America not only provides monetary compensation for the individual who excels in his/her professional field but is a fertile ground of freedom, ideas and opportunity for achievevement that is a powerful motivation on a personal esteem level, as well. The synergistic effect results is a nation that generally progresses by leaps and bounds.
As long as America remains a haven of individual human rights and freedoms, America's progress and prosperity will not fail.
Fairly intresting even if some of it is unaccurate. For example stating that the US is a superpower that nobody can match in terms of military, I think the Chinese would beg to difer on that point as would Korea. Also typical from an American point of view that the forget that it was the Russians that got Germany to surrender not the US or UK.
Also if Europe is weak then why are so many countries either trying to join up e.g. Turkey or trying to build strong trade links with the EU e.g. Asian tigers.
What this article does is enforce the universal view that the only answer that America has to any problem is to point a gun at it ( very peaceful way of doing business). The only problem with that is what happens when a country like China points one back.
I would agree that this article for once is more insightful that the kind of rantings we read from Curley's pal Krauthammer
But among the points, there is too often caricatural picturing of the situation. Facts are even not mentionned, for example, the role of the military in the US' currency unmerited value in the world, explaining that this currency's value is directly related to the US agressivity in term of foreign policy. Caution: this is only the conclusion of respected economists. I mean - spending such an amount of dollars in the military is jeopardizing the US economy with increased deficits and unbalanced budgets.
As for the europeans not able to have a military able to challenge the US one: it is only a question of will, and, if this need was not evident till the end of the cold war, Bush's "huge mistakes", beratings and misleadings have had the merit to shed some light into the necessity to have a real credible and significant military of our own. Perhaps the Europeans owe Bush a statue in front of their parliament for having contributed so much to this suddden awareness, thus to the european merging process.
Oh, and just an historical recall: the French have long been considered as a threat to the european stability. They were the tough guys and were renowned for their combativity - the Italians used to talk about the "furia francese" on the battlefields. So, reading that the lion (Germany) is associated with the lamb (France) in a peacified Europe is amusing. Well it only shows by what kind of reducing processes geopolitics is dealt with this kind of author. But after all - if we succeed in living in peace in a free entity - why not a lamb and a lion together
lodgebo said this in post #5 :
What this article does is enforce the universal view that the only answer that America has to any problem is to point a gun at it ( very peaceful way of doing business).
America doesn't do business via a gun—but sometimes America needs to take care of business via one.
I'd say America's super staus is based on two things.
1. 100-200 years ago, we had a major incoming of immigrants. America was the 'Land of Freedom', so I theorize that people who had a lot of drive, self initiative, self drive and so on.......saw this as a great opportunity to expand themsleves. So, we got many many well skilled people coming here. Think about it, so many sklls from so many various countries. Its kinda like a world trade show. Putting all of these great ideas together helped flourish a lot. And it showed. Problem is now, immigration has reached the point saturation (as well in many European countries), where it no longer is a major benefactor. I believe its now a hindurance. Immigration is taking more out of an established socitey than it offers it.
Europes reason for a lesser military?? I think Europe just has sorta ran out of room, which brings me to my second point.
2. America is a very vast expansive country. We fortuantely have a lot of land, which we won't run into problems with crowding like Europe may have, in the immediate future. This is also counter productive, as I believe this is the reason I think music and small bands do better in Europe than in the US. US cities are too far apart, and too far for many people to want to travel to see shows. Europes cities and countries even are much smaller and therefore more ideal for touring.
Actually Europe is getting bigger in terms of members which obviously make it bigger geographically. over 20 countries make up Europe with another 4 at least wanting to join. Europe looks pretty big if you ask me.
